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THE CHADHA DECISION: A NEW WEIGHT
IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL BALANCE
Murray Snow*
Introduction
In the past decade, there has been an
interesting argument in American legal circles
concerning the constitutionality of the legislative
veto. This type of veto is a provision included in
legislation (and in some cases making up the
legislation itself) ~hich allows Congress to cancel
executive actions.
Some scholars argue that
since such vetoes take place and have the force
of law without receiving the signature of the
President, nor in many cases the approval of the
other House of Congress, they are unconstitutional. Others point out, however, that for the
Congress to exercise a legislative veto both
Houses of Congress must have already agreed to,
and the President have signed, a bill containing a
legislative
veto provision.
Therefore,
they
argue,
su<p
propositions
are
indeed
constitutional.
Since the first use of the legislative veto in
1932, Congress has devised several different
methods to achieve a cancellation of executive
action.
They have all subsequently come to be
known as legislative vetoes.
The first is the
one-house negative veto. A veto of this nature
authorizes either the House or the Senate to
cancel an executive action if a majority of its
members oppose it.
This is the most common
legislative veto device. The second method is the
*Murray is a senior majoring in Political
Science.
He is both a Truman and a Karl G.
Maeser Scholar.
He plans to attend law school
this fall.
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one-house positive veto. In this case, before an
executive action can be made permanent, at least
a majority of one House of Congress must approve
it.
Though this type of veto action has been
considered by Congress, it has not yet been
used.
Other veto provisions which have been
frequently used are those requiring either approval or disapproval of executive acts by concurrent resolutions of both Houses of Congress
such as the War Powers Act.
Still other veto
provIsIOns permit approval or disapproval of
executive actions by the majority vote of a House
or Senate committee. Finally, other such propositions permit Congress to approve part of a~
executive action while disapproving another part.
Many cases have been brought to court
challenging the constitutionality of the legislative
veto, but only two have been decided on their
merits. In the first, Atkins vs. u. S., the U. S.
Court of Claims ruled that the legislative veto was
a proper congressional exercise of authority
under the Necessary and Proper clause. In the
second, INS vs. Chadha, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals ruled that the legislative veto provision in the ImmJgration and Nationality Act was
unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court, shortly
after the Ninth Circuit Court's decision, agreed
to review the Chadha case and ultimately upheld
that court's opinion.
The decision reached in
this case should prove to play a significant role
in balancing the power between the executive and
legislative branches of government in the near
future. My research question is then, what will
be the public policy implications of the Supreme
Court's decision in IN S vs. Chadha?
To answer this question it will be necessary
to first examine the Chadha case and the resulting opinion of the Supreme Court. It will then
be necessary to determine the breadth of the
court's decision.
Notably, does the reasoning
expressed in this opinion invalidate all legislative
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vetoes or merely one-house vetoes such as the
one found in the Immigration and Nationality Act
upon which the Chadha case was based? Or, was
the decision sufficiently narrow so as to strike
only the legislative veto provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act? Once these questions have been answered, it will be possible to
evaluate some of the public policy implications of
this decision and to suggest methods through
which Congress might be able to continue to
constitutionally pursue its oversight function in
light of the Court's reasoning.
The Chadha Case

5

Jagdish Rai Chadha, an East Indian born in
Kenya, was admitted to the U. S. in 1966 with a
non-immigrant student visa. The visa expired on
June 30, 1972, but Chadha remained in the country.
In October of 1973, he was summoned
before the district director of the National Immigration Service to show cause why he should not
be deported. Chadha, under Section 244 (a) (1)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, requested
a suspension of deportation. This section of the
act gave the attorney general of the United States
the discretion to suspend deportation of aliens
who met three conditions established in the act:
First, the alien must have been in the United
States continuously for a period of seven years.
Second, he had to be of good moral character,
and third, his deportation would have to result in
extreme personal hardship.
The following June after an investigation, it
was determined by an immigration judge that
Chadha met all the requirements; consequently,
his deportation was suspended.
In accordance
with the Immigration and Nationality Act, Congress was advised of the suspension.
The act
then gave either House of Congress the right to
veto the attorney general's decision and invalidate
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the suspension anytime within eighteen months
after it was notified of the suspension. If Congress failed to act within this time period, the
alien's status would be permanently changed to
that of permanent resident alien.
In late December 1976, the House of Representatives, upon the recommendation of the House
Judiciary Committee, voted to veto the suspension
of Chadha and five others.
The following January, Chadha's original immigration judge reopened proceedings to deport Chadha.
Chadha
moved to block the hearing on the grounds that
the section of the Immigration and Nationality Act
which granted Congress the legislative veto was
unconstitutional.
The immigration judge refused
to rule on the motion since he ha<t no authority to
rule on the constitutionality of the sections involved.
The Board of Immigration Appeals also
refused. to respond to the motion for the same
reasons. Chadha finally filed a petition with the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for a review of his
deportation order.
The court, after hearing
arguments, dismissed the deportation action on
the grounds that the legislative veto contained in
the act violated the constitutional doctrine of
separation of powers.
The Supreme Court's Decision
The Chadha case was accepted by the
Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari shortly
after the Ninth Circuit Court had ruled.
The
case was first argued in the court in February
1982, but at the end of the term no decision was
announced.
Rearguments were held in the 1982-83 term,
and a decision upholding the Ninth Circuit Court
was released on June 23, 1983. Before addressing the question of the constitutionality of the
legislative veto in his opinion written for the

CHADHA DECISION

103

court, Chief Justice Warren Burger established
that Chadha had ~tanding, and that the case was
a justiciable one.
Then, he began to examine
the constitutionality of the legislative veto.
According to the Court, Article One of the Constitution establishes several different requirements
for all legislative actions:
All legislative Powers herein granted
shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States, which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives. Art. I, s.l. (Emphasis added)
Every Bill which shall have passed the
House of Representatives
and
the
Senate, shall, before it becomea Law,
be presented to the President of the
United States; . . . Art. I, s. 7, cl. 2.
(Emphasis added)
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to
which the Concurrence of the Senate
and House of Representatives may be
necessary (except on a question of
Adjournment) shall be presented to the
President of the United States; and
before the Same shall take Effect, shall
be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be passed by two
thirds of the Senate and House of
Representatives, according to the Rule~
and Limitations prescribed in the Case
of a Bill. 7 Art.!. s.7, c1.3. (Emphasis added)
According to the Court, the intent of the founders concerning these sections of Article One is
clear. The legislature, in the view of the founders, was inherently the most powerful branch of
government. It was therefore most necessary to
contain the power of that branch. As one limitation, it . was decided to require that legislation
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pass through both Houses of Congress to ensure
that the implications of all legislative acts would
be carefully evaluated before being sent to the
President
for
his
signature.
The
next
requirement, that of presentment of the legislation
to the President, would constitute the second
check on congressional power. The President, in
effect, would represent the national interest and
not the factionalized smaller interests one could
find represented in Congress. If the President
objected to a bill, he could veto it and thus
prevent its implementation.
If he approved a
bill, he could sign it, and it would become law. It
is clear that the founders intended for all
congressional initiatives to pass by this process
when it is noted that Madison, in debate over
Section Seven Clause Three of Article One, when
the section applied only to bills, suggested the
idea that the legislature might try to escape the
requirements imposed in the section by substituting the word resolution or vote in place of the
word bill.
Consequently,
the Constitutional
Congres~ changed
this clause to its present
reading.
To prevent the President from arbitrarily
blocking Congress and deadlocking the government with his veto power, the founders provided
that if two-thirds of both houses voted to do so,
they could override the President and implement
the legislation over his veto.
Does the legislative veto action taken in the
Chadha case amount to a legislative act that would
be subject to the bicameral and presentment
requirements established by the Constitution for
all legislative actions?
First, the Court holds
that when any branch of government acts, "it is
presumptively exercising 9the power the Constitution has delegated to it."
The power the Constitution has assigned to either House of Congress
is that of legislation. Although there are express
powers granted to the separate Houses of Con-
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gress which are not legislative in nature, and
thus not subject to the bicameral or presentment
requirements of the Constitution, they are included in the Constitution in explicit and unambiguous terms. These powers are those of the
House to bring impeachment charges against
officials, and of the Senate to ratify treaties,
judge in impeachment cases, and approve or
disapprove presidential appointments included in
Sections Two and Three of Article One and
Section Two Clause Two of Article Two.
The
very explicit nature of these provisions provides
support
for
the
Court's
conclusion
that
"congressional authority cannot be implied," and
that powers that are not specifically granted to
Congress, and are unobtainable through t~o
Necessary and Proper Clause, are denied.
Therefore, all legislative actions apart from these
special cases specified in the Constitution are
required to meet the specifications of bicameralism
and presentment.
Second, whether a matter is in fact an
exercise of legislative power depends upon the
subject of the actions taken.
In the Chadha
case, it is clear that the action taken has been
legislative "in purpose and effect." The House of
Representatives has altered "leg'al rights, duties,
and relations of persons including the Attorney
General, Executive branch officials, and Chadha,
[all
of 11 whom]
are
outside
the
legislative
branch. "
What this veto decision amounts to is
a policy decision by Congress which, in absence
of the veto provision of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, would have required that a bill
be passed by a majority of both Houses of
Congress and be presepted for the President's
signature to become law.
The Court acknowledges that the legislative
veto is "efficient, convenient, and useful in
facilitating functions of government."
But the
mere fact that it is useful does not mean that it
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is constitutional.
The Court in fact rules that
the congressional veto provision in Section 244
(c) (2) of the Iramigration and Nationality Act is
unconstitutional.
The Breadth of the Court's Decision
The Court in this decision has obviously not
only ruled on the constitutionality of one legislative veto provision, but has established requirements for all actions of a legislative nature
which seem to preclude virtually any form of the
legislative veto.
Although there was some
speculation after this decision concerning the
status of legislative vetoes
by
concurrent
resolution, a reading of the decision reveals that
even vetoes passed in both Houses still fail to
meet the presentment requirements established in
the opinion, and thus would presumably also be
uncons ti tu tional.
Justice Powell, though agreeing with the
opinion of the court in the Chadha case, expresses the view in his concurring opinion that
the decision should have been based on narrower
grounds. He finds that Congress, in its determination that Chadha does not meet the criteria
established for permanent residency, has assumed
a judicial function and thus violated the principle
of separation of powers. This alone, according to
Powell, would b sufficient to decide the case in
14
Chadha's favor.
Instead, he notes that "The
court's decision . . . apparently will invalidate
the use of the legislative vet~5 The breadth of
this holding gives one pause."
Justice White, although agreeing with Powell
that the case could be decided on narrower
separation of powers issues, dissents in the case.
He does not, however, seem to have any arguments about the resolution of the Chadha case
itself. He is rather dissenting from the prece-
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dent which in his opinion destroys the legislative
veto.
Today the Court not only invalidates
s. 244 (c) (2) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, but also sounds the
death knell for nearly 200 other statutory provisions in which Congress has
reserved
a
legislative
veto....
[ The] decision strikes down in one fell
swoop provisions in more laws enacted
by Congress than the court has 1Uumulatively invalidated in its history.
Though White in a footnote to his dissent
expresses the hope that perhaps some form of a
legislative veto will eventually be held as constitutional, (he suggests that a resolution of
disapproval might not have legal effect in its own
right, and thus not be supject to bicameral and
presentment requirements)
in light of the
Court's decision it seems unlikely, even to him.
Assuming, then, that the reasoning in the
Court's opinion, as well as the concurring and
dissenting opinions of Powell and White indicate
that, at least for the moment, all legislative
vetoes can be held unconstitutional, what will be
the consequences for Congress?
The History of the Legislative Veto
To answer the above question, it will be
necessary to determine what statutes containing
legislative vetoes were in force when the Chadha
decision was made.
The history of legislation
containing the- veto goes back to 1932, when
Congress authorized President Hoover to reorganize the executive branch subject t01~he disapproval of either House of Congress.
During
the remainder of the 1930s and 19405, twent¥§
three
other
veto provisions were passed.

,
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Several of these bills were again grants to the
President to reorganize the executive branch
subject to the approval of Congress. The majority of the remainder of the veto legislation passed
during this period was special grants of authori2~
to the President to cope with World War Two.
An example of such legislation would be the
Lend-Lease Act. In this act Congress authorized
the President to trade destroyers to Britain for
leases on British military bases, but the Congress
retained the power, through a legislative veto, to
strip him of this authority at any time. Roosevelt
thought at the time that the veto proposition in
the Lend-Lease Act was unconstitutional, but, he
did not veto the b¥l because it was necessary to
his foreign policy.
Though Roosevelt's failure
to veto the legislative veto in the Lend-Lease
legislation did not put an end to its use, as it
might have done, none of the statutes from this
time period are affected by the Chadha decision
since the subject matter of that legislation is no
longer relevant to any ongoing governmental
program.
During the fifties and sixties, the legislative
veto became much more commonly used. In fact,
eig'hty-three statutes containing such Wovisions
were passed during these two decades.
In the
early fifties the veto began to be used to regulate
immigration pr~~esses and. gov;rnment co~str~c
tion contracts.
The ImmIgratIOn and NatIonality
Act, which was the legislation under question in
the Chadha case, w~4 first passed in 1952 and
then revised in 1967.
The Congress found that
delegation of such matters as immigration to
executive or independent regulatory agencies,
subject to a veto of disapproval by Congress, was
a convenient way to discharge their growing
responsibilities.
With the continued growth of
government during this period, it soon became a
necessity for Congress to delegate many matters
other than immigration and government construction to executive departments and regulatory
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agencies for administration. 25
The rules that
these agencies made in the process of enforcing
congressional legislation consequently had life
same force of law as did congressional statute.
But often the rules made by these agencies
went far beyond, or actually conflicted with, the
intent of Congress in this legislation. The honorable Edith Green, congresswoman from Oregon
and author of Title IX of the Secondary and
Higher Education Act of 1972, gave a striking
example of just such an occurrence to students at
B YU.
In a forum address delivered at B YU in
the midst of that institution's struggle with the
housing regulations issued by HEW subsequent to
Title IX, Ms. Green identified the original in ten t
of that section in The Secondary and Higher
Education Act.
The thirty-six words that make
up the title were intended, according to Ms.
Green, to "promote equality of opportunity among
the sexes by eliminating admissions restrictions,
scholarship discriminations, and providing female
profes2?rs with the same pay as male professors. "
Unfortunately, HEW manufactured over
20,000 words of regulations to enforce Title IX
alone, which, among other things, had the effect
of "eliminating intercollegiate sports, co-ed physical education classes, all male-choirs, the Boy
Scouts, the Girl Scouts," and many other organizations. This "illegitimate progeny" of Ms. Green's
legislation ~:gs often tempted her to deny original
authorship.
Ms. Green also mentions in her address
other Congressional problems in the regulation of
administrative agencies. For instance, the speed
with which these agencies make rules pursuant to
legislation, compared to the time it takes Congress to overturn objectionable rules by specific
statute, is an overwhelming obstacle for Congress. One month after the passage of the bill
authorizing OSHA in April 1971, a special 250page edition of the Federal Register was pub-
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lished imposing new federal regulations derived
from the original O~JIA legislation which was only
a few pages long.
In the face of regulating
such prodigious regulatory activity, many Congressmen argue that the legj81ative veto is the
only acceptable alternative.
With the veto
provision included in legislation, Congress could
eliminate the objectionable regulation by a majority
vote of one House. Such a procedure was much
easier than the passage by both Houses of Congress and submittal to the President for approval
of a change of agency rules.
The increase in regulatory activity and the
desire of Congress to oversee such regulation
would have been enough to ensure the growth of
the legislative veto in the 1970s. But legislative
vetoes began to be used as well during this
period to exercise direct checks on presidential
initiatives. Over the course of America's history,
Presidents had gradually usurped, or been freely
granted by Congress, powers that were not
originally granted to that office in the Constitution. For instance, the evolution of the executive agreement allowed th"e President to make
agreements with other countries without submitting to the approval process of the Senate which
seemed to violate the intent of the founders. As
well, America had fought in the Korean and
Vietnam wars without ever receiving any declaration of war fr~m Sqngress which the Constitution
seemed to reqUIre.
The Congress, sensing the growing "imperial" nature of the Presidency, determined to
subject several of the presidential prerogatives to
the legislative veto.
Consequently, Congress
passed bills which were in essence legislative
vetoes, giving it the right, among other matters,
"to approve executive agreements to sell arms to
foreign nations, to veto import relief decisions
made by the executive, to determine which nations could have most-favored nation treatment in
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trade matters, and to determine which countries
are eligible 3~r ineligible for military or economic
assistance. "
Some of these bills were measures
such as the War Powers Act, the Budget and
Impoundment Control Act, and the International
Security Assistance and Arms Control Act. These
acts, while leaving the President some degree of
discretion in such areas as war powers, budget
management, and international arms sales, still
required the consent of at least one, and often
both Houses of Congress before his actions could
be fully carried out.
The legislative veto, then, has been used as
a congressional device to control the executive in
two broad areas.
First, it is an attempt to
control or at least oversee the administration of
legislation by executive and independent regulatory agencies. Second, it attempts to control the
initiatives of t~ President himself in the pursual
of his policies.
Due to its newfound dual use,
the Congress passed eighty-one laws containing
163 legisla \ve veto provisions in the first half of
the 1970s.

3

In light of the amount of legislation passed
in the last three decades containing legislative
vetoes, the Court's decision in INS vs. Chadha
could have enormous implications. Justice White,
as an appendix to his dissent, added a selected
list of different statutes containing legislative
vetoes which, as a consequence of the court's
decision, will be affected. These statutes regulated areas in almost every field of government,
but especially in the areas of "governmental
reorganization, budgets, foreign affairs, war
powers, regulation of trade, s?S5ty, energy, the
environment, and the economy."
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The Effect of the Legislative Veto
and Its Cancellation

Despite the fact that the legislative veto has
been widely used in legislation in the past several
years, if it has not been an effective method to
fulfill the congressional oversight function, there
will be few, if any, implications for public policy.
There seems to be little debate, however,
regarding the efficacy of the legislative veto in
regulating agency rule making.
Its cancellation
should therefore prove to have the potential to
return a considerable amount of regulatory
"power" to the administrative agencies of the
executive branch.
The effect of such a power
transfer is currently" an item of some controv~rsy.
Proponents of the legislative veto claim that
this power now returns to a mass of fourth,
fifth, and seventh l!J(fel bureaucrats, who are
responsible to no one.
Such bureaucrats, these
veto proponents claim, are only trying to build
their domain of influence, and have no electoral
check, as does the Congress.
To deny the
legislative veto to Congress, as Chadha has done,
is to invite a return to the regulatory abuses of
the OSHA regulation and Title IX.
Opponents of the veto, however, applaud the
decision of the Court.
They contend that the
veto device placed too much power in the hands
of Congress, and that this power would be more
dangerous vested in Congress than in the administrative agencies.
First, they claim, the probability of governmental deadlock is much lessened
by the Chadha decision.
An agency trying to
execute its
statutory
responsibilities
before
Chadha could be continually frustrated by legislative vetoes. When issuing a veto, the Congress
is not required to indicate on what grounds they
find a particular rule objectionable.
Instead of
offering suggestions for possible alternatives, it
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merely issues rejections.
Congress can, consequen tly, easily hide responsibility for failure of
implementation on the "governmental bureaucracy"
when, in reality, the failure is its own. Second,
the legislative veto tends to permit sloppy legislation. Since Congress, with the veto, has been
able to implement its will regardless of the statute's actual content, legislation tends to be less
carefully written.
This invites litigation and.
waste, and is the cause of some confusion in the
regulatory agencies themselves.
Third, special
interest groups exercise a large influence in
Congress.
When special interest groups find
certain administrative rules objectionable, as some
certainly do, they can exercise considerable
pressure on Congress to veto the rule.
This,
veto critics point out, is hardly in the public
interest.
Also, the veto's presence in statutes
regulating industry allows Congress to be constantly revising rules which regulate that industry and consequently deprive those who are
concerned of any sense of I3fiTmanency in the
rules regarding their industry.
The striking of the veto will result then,
according to the opponents of the Court's decision, in an increase of "red tape" and a power
grant to an unelected and uncontrollable bureaucracy.
Proponents of the decision find that it
will result in the elimination of the potential for
governmental deadlock, and the end of sloppy
legislation which could result in increasing litigation.
Also limited, according to those who
favor the decision, will be the power of special
interest groups to regulate government, and the
past impermanency of governmental regulation.
Both opponents and proponents of the
Court's decision seem to conclude that, with
Chadha, the Court has concluded that once Congress has delegated the power to make laws to
regulatory agencies, it is limited iIJ~ts control of
the rules that those agencies make.
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The legislative vetoes intended to place limits
on presidential power have had a far more ambiguous effect. Some of them such as the International Security Assistance and Arms Control Act,
which requires the President to gain approval of
the Senate for all arms sales to other countries,
have been undeniably effective. Note, for exampIe, the rather extended Senate hearings regarding the sale of AWACS radar planes to Saudi
Arabia.
Others, however, have not been so successful.
For example, the Budget Impoundment and
Control Act provides, among other things, that if
the President impounds already budgeted funds,
either House of Congress, acting within forty-five
days of the receipt of such information, may
require the President to spend those funds.
In
1976, the General Accounting Office reported that
President Ford had violated the act by failing to
report the impoundment of 126 million dollars
budgeted for child nutrition and education programs until after the adjournment of the annual
session of Congress. By the time Congress had
reassembled, the government had entered a new
fiscal year, and thus lacked any power to force
hi~9to spend funds in the previous year's budget.
It has also been asserted by Miller and
Knapp that the War Powers Act, which allows
Congress to remove troops placed in combat
situations by the President, if, after 60 days, a
majority of both houses of Congress do not consent to the deployment of the troops, is actually
an empty shell which would never be invoked in
the case of a Presidential commitment of troops to
a combat situation. This is partly due to the fact
that, as in the Mayaguez incident, often the
military action in question would be terminated
long before the time limit in which the President
could freely act would be reached.

unity

Second, the need and tendency for national
in crisis situations seems to suggest that it
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would be rather unlikely for Congress to override
the President should any conflict last over the
sixty-day limit. The War Powers Act thus seems
to be another Congressional veto provision which
has had little ~ffect in practice in spite of its
theoretical goal.
In short, though the Chadha decision has
the potential to return the power to the President
to institute freely his foreign and domestic policy,
it is doubtful, in at least the instances cited
above, that the President had ever lost it.

Legislative Remedies
Not long after the Chadha decision was
reached, then Secretary of the Interior, James
Watt, wrote a letter to Representative Morris
Udall informing him that due to the Supreme
Court's recent Chadha decision, Udall's House
Interior Committee no longer had the authority to
ban the Interior 4pepartment's controversial Montana coal sales.
Although this legal opinion
may have been technically correct, the executive
departments and regulatory agencies would do
well not to assume too much power as a result of
the Chadha decision.
F. M. Kaiser, a senior research analyst for
the Congressional Research Service, in seeming
anticipation of the Chadha decision, wrote an
article detailing the techniques that Congress has
successfully used in the past to overturn agency
rules, and sugg'ests them as possible alternatives
to the legislative veto.
Interestingly enough,
Kaiser suggests five statutory methods and six
nonstatutory methods which Congress has at its
disposal to regulate administrative agencies other
than the veto.
All, of course, are not equally
efficacious.
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The first method is the statutory rejection of
a regulatory rule. This is a difficult and timeconsuming procedure requiring the agreement of
both Houses of Congress and the signature of the
President.
It has, however, the advantage of
being a very effective method of overturning
agency rules. In fact, the definition and clarity
which necessarily accompany a statute make the
statutory rejection a much more powerful ref,w:ation of an agency rule than a legislative veto.
Second, Congress has the authority to cut
off funding for any regulatory program or, if it
chooses, for the enforcement of a particular rule.
Though this is an undeniably effective method for
enforcing the legislative will reg'arding the enforcement of regulatory agency rules, it too has
its drawbacks. For this method to be effective,
it is necessary for Congress to reimpose the
budget restriction on an annual basis.
Besides
the fact that yearly action is necessary, some
regulatory activities, unfortunately for Congress,
fall under J3udget allocations which are virtually
indivisible.
Third, the bill which originally authorizes
agency regulation in a certain area could require
that specified agencies consult on possible regulations pursuant to the legislation.
The establishment of this or other procedural requirements,
could provide new insights and perspectives on
possible rules and, in any case, would slow down
the rule-making process w~!ch wOl,lld make
Congressional oversight easier.
Fourth, Congress could also require that
agencies submit their proposed rules for congressional review before implementation.
Though
Congress no longer has the power to veto any
objectionable rules that it might find, the fact
that an agency's proposed regulations would be
reviewed might res'4st in more careful drafting of
agency regulations.
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The final statutory method which Kaiser
suggests has been the most popular to date in
regulating agency functions.
Congress, it must
be remembered, holds the ultimate trump of
altering the authority of regulatory agencies.
This could be accomplished in a variety of ways.
First, Congress can grant exemptions of authority
to the agency head. Second, it can remove areas
from the jurisdiction of the entire agency.
Third, it can, by statute, end regulatory rule
making activities in certain areas. Fourth, it can
provide certain organizations subject to agency
regulations with waivers from such agency regulations. Fifth, it can transfer the regulatory
authority from one agency to another more apt to
comply with Congress. And sixth, Congress can,
if it wishes to do s~6 completely deregulate the
industry in question.
Although this method can
be effective, it can also be dangerous.
Sometimes the change of agency jurisdiction
to frustrate the implementation of objectionable
regulation causes confusion as to which, if any,
regulatory agency is concerned with which regulatory activity.
This confusion tends to leave
some areas which need regulation completely
unregulated and, in the case of waiver provisions, leaves some businesses completely free from
all regulation under a particular agency in what
seems to be a discriminatory practice.
The nonstatutory methods which Kaiser
suggests, would also seem to have considerable
potential to regulate agency rules. First, pursuant to its legislative oversight, investigative,
and confirmation functions, Con gress could instigate an embarrassing oversight hearing into the
regulatory actions taken by a particular agency.
Second, it could establish permanent subcommittees to oversee agency rule making in general.
Third, it could include with each bill which
authorizes agency rule making Cong-ressional
instructions
regarding
such
implementation.
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Fourth, members of Congress could make floor
statements critical of ongoing or proposed regulatory programs.
Finally, congressional offices
concerned with the implementation of a particular
piece of legislation could enter into direct contact
with the regulatory agency assigned to admWster
the bills implementation to offer their input.
Kaiser points out that due to the nature of
politics, these nonstatutory methods may prove to
be more effective in the long-run in overseeing
agency activities 4ihan the statutory methods he
has cited above.
However, it should be noted
that they offer no direct effect on the rules made
by agencies. They are only attempts to pressure
the agency in question into conforming with the
congressional will concerning implementation of its
legisla tion.
The main reason Congress opted to use the
legislative veto so extensively was due to the
relative ease it provided Congress in dealing
directly with specific agency functions.
All of
the options mentioned above by Kaiser have their
relative strengths and weaknesses, but it should
be noted that to achieve the same result, virtually all of them require considerably more effort
on Congress's part than did the legislative veto.
Senator Jacob Javits, a proponent of the
veto, points out that the policy of congressional
delegation of legislative authority to the executive
branch is too deeply JIPbedded in governmental
policy to be reversed.
But, if Congress now
has to spell out to the regulatory agencies with
each bill just exactly what regulations they can
and cannot make, or if it has to go through
strenuous machinations to negate the effectiveness
of one rule without damaging the regulation of
others, it will be little advantaged by such a
policy.
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In light of the many methods offered by
Kaiser through which Congress can control regulatory agencies, the question raised by the
Chadha decision is not whether Congress has the
power
to
regulate
administrative
agencies.
Rather, the question seems to be whether or not,
in view of the time requirements which such
action would cost an already overburdened
Congress, the legislative branch will have the will
to impose its power on such agencies.
It is my conclusion that Congress, while not
relinquishing the power to regulate administrative
agencies, will find that the loss of the legislative
veto will require the use of methods which are
not nearly as efficient.
Consequently, Congress
will probably continue to regulate what are, in its
opinion, the most serious administrative abuses of
legislative authority, but it will not have the time
to regulate as completely the implementation of its
legislation as it has in the past.
The result
should prove to be a return of substantial initiative to the executive and independent regulatory
agencies in the administration of legislation.

Though the legislature, in spite of the
Chadha decision, retains the power to exercise
control over regulatory agencies, should they
decide to use it, it is not at all clear that in the
absence of the veto it will be able to retain much,
if any,
of its authority over presidential
initiatives.
Although Kaiser's suggestions would seem to
be a powerful congressional tool in overseeing
administrative agencies, it is doubtful that many
of these techniques can be used successfully to
regulate presidential initiatives.
Administrative
agencies, for the most part, owe their existence
to Congress; therefore, Congress can manipulate
their jurisdiction as it chooses.
However, the
President can claim authority from the Constitution, which puts him on a coequal basis with
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Congress.
As Kaiser suggests, the legislature
does have the final trump of refusing to finance
any presidential actions it opposes.
But, it is
not nearly so easy to cut off the funding of
presidential programs as it is to restrict the
budgets of administrative agencies. In the first
place, it is the President himself who submits the
budget to Congress. Theoretically, this does not
affect the power of Congress to alter the presiden tial budget, but practice seems to indicate
that the executive preparation of the budget can
be a large advantage to the ~cfesident in the
preservation of his programs.
Besides this
fact, the Congress, except in rare circumstances,
is not unified against the President. The President, whoever he may be, can count on at least
minimal support from those who are in his party,
and from those who support his spending programs.
Consequently, though it is not impossible, it is very difficult to withhold appropriations from a spending program which the President truly desires to implement.
In the past, congressional attempts to control the President through the legislative veto
have suffered from the failure of Congress to
clarify just what was meant by certain terms used
in the veto provisions or by the failure of the
veto to really propose an acceptable remedy to
the presidential action in question.
The President has often used these ambiguities to his
advantage.
Note, for instance, the funds for
child nutrition and education which were successfully impounded by Ford in spite of the Budget
Impoundment and Control Act, and the failure to
invoke the War Powers Act in the recent crisis in
Lebanon due to Reagan's ref.usal to a?~r:owlesIPe
that the Marines had entered mto "hostllitles."
It is probable that
gain some say over the
tial initiatives which
through the invalidation

Congress will attempt to
acceptability of presidenit has apparently lost
of the legislative veto. I
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would suggest that in doing so, Congress repeal
any veto legislation such as the War Powers Act
which contains possibly ambiguous terms behind
which the President could hide. Then, it should
replace such vetoes with statutes which either
define constitutional terms or require that certain
presidential actions be carried out subsequent to
the Cons tit ution.
For instance, if Congress
desired to regain the power to declare war, it
could repeal the War Powers Act, and in its place
pass a statute defining exactly what a state of
war is. Since the Constitution gives to Congress
the power to declare war, should a President
continue to carryon hostilities after he has
surpassed the congressional definition of what a
state of war is, he would be subject to impeachment by the House of Representatives.
It is
interesting to note that, in such a proceeding,
the jury would be the Senate, and would presumably recognize the validity of its own legislation.
The President would, of course, have
recourse to the courts to challenge the statute,
but, it seems to be a strong possibility in view of
past cases involving war powers, that the court
would find that the question was a political one,
and would not accept the case for argument.
However, if the Court were to accept the case,
the Congress could note that the Supreme Court
has held in Gibbons vs. Ogden that the power
granted to Cong'ress to regulate commesfe is also
the power to decide what commerce is.
It does
not seem to me to be a great leap of logic to
assume, then, that the power to declare war is
the power to decide what war is. It would, in
any case, be seemingly difficult for the Supreme
Court to declare such a statute unconstitutional
and still maintain that
Congress had any
meaningful power to declare war. Nonetheless, if
the
courts
were
to
hold
the
statute
unconstitutional, Congress would still have recourse to the nonstatutory method of an oversight
hearing which, though time-consuming and im-
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practical in the long-run, could bring
political pressure to bear on the President.

some

Using this same method, and with a little
imaginative legislation, Congress might regain
much of the authority over presidential initiatives
that it seemingly lost through the Chadha decision.
For instance, Congress might pass a
statute which required that all arms negotiations
be conducted by treaty. If such a method were
to be held constitutional, or if the courts refused
to hear the case due to its nature, Congress
would regain the power they seemingly lost
through the invalidation of the legislative veto
provision in the International Security Assistance
and Arms Control Act.
~

.

might be noted, however, that some
serious disadvantages accompany this method of
action.
First, Congress must try to regain
control over presidential initiatives in a piecemeal
fashion. There appears to be no blanket method
through which Congress could regain the control
over the President it has apparently lost through
the Chadha decision. If Congress cannot stake a
valid constitutional claim in areas in which it
desires to regain some control over presidential
initiatives, it will probably never regain it.
Second, any definitional statutes passed by
Congress are bound to be somewhat arbitrary;
they cannot, consequently, constitute a cure-all
in terms of regaining for Congress the discretionary powers it desires. Third, and most significantly, any such measures would almost certainly
have to be passed over presiden tial vetoes. The
super-majorities required to pass such legislation,
in light of party and other allegiances, would be
most difficult to obtain.
It

It is an inescapable conclusion, considering
these obstacles, that the Chadha decision has
given to the President the unique power over
much of the U. S. foreign and domestic policy he
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enjoyed before Congress began to restrain the
Presiden tial office through legislative vetoes.
Though there are methods through which Congress could reassert its check on presidential
power,
it is doubtful,
given the political
considerations involved, that it would ever be
able to successfully implement them. And, even
if it were to successfully implement some such
legislation, it would probably be impossible,
without the President's acquiescence, to reobtain
the broad control over the President which
Congress enjoyed before INS vs. Chadha.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court, in its Chadha decision,
effectively invalidated all le.gislative actions which
are not subjected to bicameral approval and
presentment to the President for his signature,
other than those specified in the Constitution.
This decision seems to have effectively invalidated
all uses of the legislative veto.
This veto has been an effective tool for
Congress in controlling administrative agencies
and, to some degree, presidential initiatives. Its
invalidation will require Congress to use less
efficient means for overseeing regulatory activity.
This will have both positive and negative results.
For instance, Congress will probably be more
careful in the content of its legislation and will be
less able to change agency regulations subject to
pressure from special interest groups. As well,
Congress will probably introduce procedural
barriers to slow down immature regulatory activity. However, as congressional oversight costs
Congress more time, it is apt to engage in less of
it.
This will return a considerable degree of
discretion to the appointed agency officials of the
executive branch who are likely , in some instances, to frustrate the legislation's original intent.
Due to the lack of checks on government bureau-
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and the time-consuming methods
to regulate their activity, promore serious misapplications of
will be rectified by Congress.

With the Chadha decision, Congress also
loses considerable ability to control presidential
initiatives.
Though
again,
theoretically,
Congress is not left without recourse; political
realities seem to suggest rather strongly that
Congress will fail to re gain, in any significant
measure, its former control over the President.
Despite the fact that the legislative veto has
been a useful tool to Congress, its utility has
not, and perhaps should not have, saved it from
being declared unconstitutional and thus void.
But, in its refusal to acknowledge the practical
application of the veto, the Court has refused to
consider the alternatives left to Congress in its
absence.
In so doing, it has, in my opinion,
promoted the ascendancy of the executive branch
over the legislative, which, in the intent of the
founders, would probably have been at least as
unconstitutional a concept as the legislative veto.
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